N. SAFETY AND SECURITY

N.1. Introduction

This chapter will concentrate on safety and security in "hostile" environments, i.e., in areas where there are possibilities of armed conflicts, acts of terrorism, etc. These situations may at first seem connected only with complex emergencies, but a number of natural disaster-prone countries also have these characteristics. Even though the following concerns safety and security in connection with violence, safety threats caused by natural disasters, or by post-disaster situations, must not be forgotten. These threats could be, for example, the danger of further landslides after floods or heavy rains, after-shocks in connection with earthquakes, un-safe housing after various disasters, leaking gas pipes and exposed electric cables after earthquakes, floods, etc. These threats - and others - must be taken into account when working in a disaster area.

To allow the establishment of safety and security precautions against violence it is first necessary to identify the threats to safety and security. These threats - apart from those posed by natural-disaster environments - would be typically from banditry, unrest or civil strife/armed conflict and mines. The threats themselves may be anything from simple theft, through kidnapping or being caught in cross-fire, to actually being targeted. It all depends on the security situation at your location.

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It must be made clear from the very beginning that complete safety and security are unobtainable. Good safety and security, though, are not. Usually, there would have to be a balance between security requirements, available resources and the task at hand, i.e., security must not become "a prison" preventing completion of the task.

Of course, not every mission entails safety and security threats; far from it. This chapter therefore addresses those missions that pose a safety or security risk to

the team. The following suggestions on safety and security are ideal measures to be taken. In some situations some measures may be impossible to implement, while some other situations do not warrant the use of all the measures. It all depends on conditions, and you must decide (or co-decide) on the level of security. In general, the precautions that may be taken to alleviate risks are three-fold: the first are those to be taken as a team; the second are those to be taken by the individual; and the third are those to be taken when protecting your essential resources, e.g., equipment, vehicles and fuel. The UNDAC Team Leader is responsible for the safety of his/her UNDAC team.

Completion of Basic Safety and Security in the Field CD-ROM course is mandatory for all UNDAC members.

N.2. United Nations security

Since the UNDAC team works under the aegis of the UN in-country, it is essential that team members understand the UN Security System. In each country the primary responsibility for the security and protection of UN staff members and dependants rests with the host government. In order to deal with security and protection factors, the UN refers to three manuals:

  1. UN Field Security Handbook (FSH)
  2. UN Security Operations Manual
  3. UN Security Directives.

The FSH is included in the UNDAC mission software.

UN security management system
UN security is the responsibility of the UN Department of Safety and Security (UN DSS) which is headed by an Under-Secretary General

All organizations participating in the UN security management system will assume collective responsibility for safety and security of UN personnel, irrespective of the level of that participation. Field-related costs which are incurred in the field or are directly related to providing operational support by headquarters to the field offices will be apportioned between the participating organizations.

N.2.1. UN entities concerned with security

  • **UN Department for Safety and Security (UN DSS) -** Reports directly to the Secretary-General and serves as the coordinating department at UN Headquarters for formulating policy and recommendations, responding to emergency situations, coordinating inter-agency safety programmes and taking decisions relating to the relocation/evacuation of staff members.
  • **Designated Official for Security (DO) -** This is normally the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC). The DO has

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the responsibility for the security management arrangements of the UN system. The DO is directly accountable to the Secretary-General through UN DSS for ensuring the safety and security of all staff members and dependants at the duty station. In some situations, the UNDAC Team Leader may be appointed to be DO with responsibility for the UNDAC team.

- **The Security Management Team (SMT) –** The DO will constitute this entity which will be composed of representatives of UN agencies, programmes and funds at the duty station, and is responsible for the management and coordination of security on an inter-agency basis, e.g., ensuring that a functioning and effective Security Plan is implemented, establishing the Minimum Operating Security Standard (MOSS), and ensuring that resources are available to implement approved measures.

- **Chief Security Advisor (CSA) –** This is an internationally recruited security professional appointed by UN DSS who serves as the primary advisor to the DO and the SMT on all matters related to security. He/she is the senior security official at the duty station and directly accountable to UN DSS. While the DO has the responsibility for the day-to-day management of the CSA, on substantive matters the CSA will report concurrently to the DO and UN DSS.

- **Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO) –** In larger duty stations, internationally recruited FSCOs may be deployed to assist and work under the supervision of the CSA.

- **Area Security Coordinators (ASC) -** They have responsibilities similar to those of the DO and are appointed in larger countries that have specific areas separated from the capital city.

- **Wardens and Deputy Wardens -** They are appointed by the DO to ensure the proper implementation of security arrangements in predetermined zones of a city or facility.

The Security Plan is the primary tool for security preparedness at the duty station and is established by the DO and the SMT. It describes measures and arrangements to be followed in the event of emergency situations. Natural disasters may affect the Security Plan in a way that human-made threats are temporarily down scaled but the safety precautions one must take are escalated.

Security of the personnel of the UN peacekeeping missions lies under the jurisdiction of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and/or the Force Commander.

N.3. UN security phases

The five security phases describe security conditions in a given county or in parts of a country; are standard for all duty stations and are included in all Security

Plans. Phases may be implemented in sequential order or as the situation dictates and one part of a country could be under a different phase than the remainder of the country.

- Phase I: Precautionary.
- Phase II: Restricted Movement.
- Phase III: Relocation.
- Phase IV: Emergency Operations.
- Phase V: Evacuation.

During Phases I and II, travel clearance must be obtained from the DO. For subsequent phases, clearance must be obtained from the UN DSS in New York, on the recommendation of the DO. Clearance signifies that the DO is aware of the staff member's presence in the country and that he/she should be included in any evacuation plans or security arrangements. Clearance means, also, that there is no security reason why staff members cannot travel to the location. Upon arrival, staff members should contact the DO for a security briefing.

In the case of an UNDAC team deployment, the team should get a security briefing as soon as possible after arrival. If it is not possible for the whole team to attend, the Team Leader should have the briefing in order to orient the team. After the briefing the team should adjust the Plan of Action accordingly.

Phase I - Precautionary

Phase I is declared to warn staff members that the security situation in the country - or parts of it - warrants this declaration. The declaration includes a ban on the travel of missions, staff members and their families without prior clearance. Staff members should ensure that the office of the DO is aware of their movements. In addition to this, the DO takes other actions as described in the FSH.

Phase II - Restricted movement

When Phase II is declared, a higher level of alert is imposed, consisting of major restrictions on the movement of all staff members and their families. During this phase all staff members and families will remain at home unless otherwise instructed. In addition, no in-coming or in-country travel should take place without specific authorization by the DO. Again, as in Phase I, the DO takes a number of actions described in the FSH. Implementation of Phase II should be used as a transition measure.

Phase III - Relocation

This phase may be declared by the DO only when the authorization of the Secretary-General has been obtained through the UN DSS. All or some of the following actions will be taken: temporary concentration of all international staff and families; relocation of all international staff and families to alternative locations inside the country; and relocation outside the country of all eligible family members of international staff and/or non-essential international staff. Other steps that will be taken are described in the FSH.

Phase IV – Emergency operations

The authorization by the Secretary-General to declare Phase IV enables the DO, in consultation with the SMT, to recommend to the Secretary-General, through the UN DSS, the evacuation outside the country of additional international staff members. The purpose of this phase is to limit the numbers of international staff to those vital for emergency, humanitarian relief, security operations or any other operation deemed essential by the Secretary-General. Several actions described in the FSH will be taken by the DO.

Phase V - Evacuation

The authorization by the Secretary-General for the declaration of Phase V signifies that the situation has deteriorated to such a point that all remaining international staff are required to leave, without exception. Evacuation will be carried out according to plans prepared beforehand and in accordance with the country-specific situation.

UNDAC teams will normally be deployed only in conditions of Phases I to III.

N.3.1 Minimum Operating Security Standard (MOSS)

MOSS is a fundamental policy document for all UN field operations. It was developed in response to the UN requirement to ensure that minimal essential security practices are established and maintained in the delivery of security support to UN staff. MOSS is a system-wide initiative that is managed by UN DSS.

Baseline MOSS

A baseline MOSS document has been developed through discussion and coordination between UN DSS, DOs and representatives of United Nations Agencies, Programmes, Funds and other organizations. The purpose of MOSS is to establish a standard field based criteria for minimum security arrangements to enhance staff security, reduce risk and support field operations. This baseline MOSS is a generic document that sets these operating security standards for UN field operations globally. In accordance with UN Security Management policy, all DOs and their SMTs, regardless of the extant security Phase within their countries, are required to develop and implement a country-specific MOSS, using the 'baseline MOSS' as guidance.

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Accountability

Within the report of the Secretary-General, dated 28 August 2002, "Inter-organizational Security Measures: Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Field Security Management System", MOSS is a defined responsibility for senior managers in the field and at agency headquarters. As such, it is subject to accountability.

Variations to baseline MOSS

It is to be stressed that MOSS has been developed to ensure the absolute minimum standards of equipment, structures and procedures required at each field duty station. The baseline MOSS indicates, "what you must have" and not, "what you would like to have" in order to reduce risk and safely conduct operations within your country.

Varying circumstances and environments may require SMTs to increase the requirements of baseline MOSS when developing their own country-specific MOSS. This is a decision by the UN Country Team and is funded by the UN Country Team. Similarly, and on an exceptional basis only, Country Teams may request to go below baseline MOSS. If this extraordinary measure is necessary, a detailed justification is required to be forwarded to UN DSS for consideration.

Financial implications

MOSS implementation has certain financial and resource implications at the country level and funding of these remains the responsibility of the UN Country Team; UN DSS does not have funds for MOSS implementation. Any financial implications will have two aspects:

1. The inter-agency, or common system, requirement for joint funding.
2. The single-agency requirement for agency equipment.
Example: A country-specific MOSS may require a 24-7 communications centre, VHF handsets for all international staff and selected national staff, and blast protective film for all UN offices. Common system costs will include the communications centre, its operators, and its equipment. Whereas single-agency costs of the same MOSS will include VHF radios for that agency's staff and for the required blast protective film for that agency's offices only.

Malicious Acts Insurance policy

The underwriters of the Malicious Acts Insurance Policy (MAIP) have noted the United Nation's compliance to MOSS. Therefore, non-compliance of MOSS measures may be used by the policy underwriters as justification for denying or reducing compensation in the event of an incident involving United Nations staff.

Development

The development of each country-specific MOSS must be preceded by a detailed and thorough Security Risk Assessment conducted by a "Competent Authority" in coordination with the SMT. For the development of a formal Security Risk Assessment, "Competent Authorities" are considered to be: UN DSS Security personnel, CSAs, Security Officers (SO) from United Nations agencies, DPKO Chief Security Officers (CSO) or any other person specifically approved by UN DSS for that purpose.

The DO and SMT are responsible for developing their country-specific MOSS. Only one MOSS is usually produced for each country. The five steps required in the

development of a country-specific MOSS are as follows:

1. Conduct a Security Risk Assessment and determine the level of risk. Confirm security phases.

2. Compare the extant security measures in each security phase against those required in the baseline MOSS, and determine shortfalls, if any.

3. Identify what additional measures are required above the requirements of baseline MOSS, if any.

4. Once all MOSS requirements have been considered and documented, the table should be completed in the format of MOSS instructions. The SMT will then concur to this country-specific MOSS and forward it to UN DSS for review.

5. UN DSS will authorize the country-specific MOSS. The MOSS is then implemented at the country level, with equipment obtained and installed, training undertaken and structures put in place.

Implementation

The implementation of MOSS should be conducted as rapidly as possible when phases are changed; hence the need for pre-planning is paramount. Countries in No Phase MUST have a contingency for the implementation and procurement of assets and resources necessary to move to Phase I. The MOSS system is designed to ensure, as far as possible, a logical and smooth transition from a lower to a higher phase with minimal increase in actual resources. The largest resource requirement is from No Phase to Phase One.

Conclusion

The baseline MOSS is an enabling document that provides a minimum level of security preparedness necessary for UN operations globally. UN Country Teams should consider the MOSS as an enabling process and maintain the purpose of MOSS. A summary of baseline MOSS is presented in a tabular format in the annex of this chapter. Further details may be found in the FSH included in the UNDAC mission software.

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N.4. Team safety and security

While the UNDAC Team Leader is responsible for team security, it is important that everyone acknowledge his/her co-responsibility for the team's safety and security. Breaches in safety and security procedures may well endanger the team or the mission, therefore it is essential that all contribute to the established security scheme. Secondly, it is important that the Team Leader be clear about his/her responsibility for the safety of the team. Ultimately, the Team Leader is responsible for establishing team safety and security procedures and rules and for enforcing them.

It is of utmost importance that it be completely clear that the Team Leader is

always responsible for the team's safety. Therefore, he/she is always mandated to refuse tasks that pose a threat to the team's safety.

The level of the threat dictates the level of safety and security measures to be taken. It may, therefore, not be necessary to take all the precautions mentioned below. The measures taken will be on the basis of information received from, among others, the DO, the CSA/FSCO, the authorities, and humanitarian organizations in the area together with military and police intelligence, where appropriate. The following are a number of items that may help the team and Team Leader to establish realistic and relevant safety and security procedures.

General

- Safety and security measures should be realistic, not at a level higher than the situation warrants. On the other hand, it is often true that people, especially those coming from already safe and secure co-untries, do not take threats to security and safety seriously. However, it is essential that safety and security measures not be taken lightly.
- All team members must know the safety and security measures.
- With reference to local people working for the UN, procedures concerning their evacuation must be taken up with the DO.
- Try not to build up daily routines: this makes it difficult for a potential aggressor to elaborate a plan of action.
- During working hours, the team must at all times know the whereabouts of each member and the estimated time that he/she is expected to return, for example, to team headquarters. The production of route cards, on which the itinerary is written, will be of assistance.
- It may be necessary either for the team to live in the same building or, if not, to check on team members that have time off, e.g., by radio, telephone, etc. The employment of the "buddy system" (no unac-companied persons) will enhance security.

At team base

The security situation in-country must be assessed. This should be done by the Team Leader, partly from available information before the mission and partly on arrival, through, for example, the DO, the CSA/FSCO, the national authorities, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other organizations in the area. A set of safety and security rules must be established. These rules should include the following:

- UNDAC-base security, e.g., the need for guards (who could be either team members or locals, depending on the situation), admis-sion procedures, etc. If a form of ID is used, then change it from time to time.
- In case of armed conflict, it may be necessary to designate a cellar location as a shelter against shelling, air raids, etc, or dig holes for

shelter. It may also be necessary to reinforce existing buildings with, for example, sandbags and/or to tape windows to reduce the effect of flying glass caused by explosions.

- Establish a procedure to check up on team members, e.g., by using radio calls.

- Security measures concerning vehicles, equipment, etc., may be carried out by, e.g., keeping a list of equipment and regularly checking it against actual equipment, keeping equipment and vehicles (when not in use) under lock, always locking all vehicle doors, and assigning guards.

- For safety reasons, fuel should be stored away from living and working quarters as well as away from vehicles. It is important to keep an eye on fuel quantities as well as locking the stocks up, since fuel may be seen as an asset worth stealing. There should be a lower limit on fuel in the store. Enough should always be kept in case of the need for an evacuation.

In the field

When going into the field it is important to prepare the trip. There are a number of things that should be investigated and carried out before leaving and when in the field. The following will be of help in preparing and carrying out a field trip:

- Check the security situation with the DO, the CSA/FSCO, the authorities, and any organization in the area where the field trip will take place. People just back from the area may have invaluable information.

- Security clearance is mandatory for all personnel travelling to an area where a security phase is in effect. This should be obtained well in advance through the DO's office.

- Procedures concerning accidents and breakdowns must be agreed upon before a field trip. These procedures may differ depending on the situation, but make sure that the field team knows what to do and that the UNDAC base will be able to help when necessary; it is important to have telecommunications between the team and the base. If an accident occurs, especially one involving human casualties, it is important that the team have established beforehand whether it would be safe to stop and give first aid, or whether one should drive on without stopping and contact the next police station, checkpoint, hospital, etc.

- The following must be taken on the trip: spare fuel, tool kit, spare tire (or two tires if it is a long trip), a shovel, an electric flashlight, spare batteries, towing rope, rations for 24 hours, water for 24 hours (the latter all in a pack, enabling quick "get away"), first-aid or trauma kit, cash, and necessary documents, e.g., driver's license, vehicle registration papers, importation papers, radio transmission permit,

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insurance papers, etc. When driving in the winter season, you should also take warm clothes, anti-skid chains, an axe and shovel, and a primus stove with fuel for 24 hours.

• Before the trip, check that the vehicle is in good order, the fuel tank is full, and all necessary equipment is present.

The CSA/FSCO should arrange a country-specific mines briefing for the UNDAC team on arrival, if applicable.

• Establish how checkpoints should be negotiated.

• There should be radio contact between field teams and the UNDAC base, with frequent radio checks. This is one of the most important security measures to be taken and must not be overlooked. Lives may be saved if the team has radio contact, at all times, with the base. The use of an easy system of situation codes will indicate if a team member(s) is in difficulty without arousing suspicion.

• When leaving for a field trip or an excursion, write a log with complete travel details, e.g., using route cards, prior to departure, and establish call-times for radio checks.

If the field team uses more than one vehicle, there should be radio contact between them.

• A general rule is to make sure that it is obvious who you are, e.g., have big UN stickers on the vehicles, UN flags on the vehicles, etc. There may be situations, though, where the UN might be targeted. This would, of course, change the above recommendation.

• Travelling by night should, as a general rule, be avoided. If it is essential to travel at night, there should be more than one person in the vehicle and there should be more than one vehicle. You should not stop except, for example, at a checkpoint; you should know the checkpoint procedures for night travel; you should always have as much light turned on as possible; and always keep the doors locked even when driving.

• After a field trip, it is important that the field team be debriefed on the security situation, the road conditions, mood of the local population, etc. in the areas visited and the roads taken. These data should be put on file so that others going to the same area will have the latest information.

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N.4.1. Personal safety and security

Many things mentioned above are applicable to individual team members as well. The following is a list of safety and security measures that may be of help in various situations of risk:

• Be aware of what is happening around you and react accordingly, before a potential situation becomes serious - learn to be "street wise".

• Observe local behaviour as this may indicate imminent outbursts

of major trouble, shelling, etc. It is important to observe changes in the normal habits of the local population.

● Do not carry large amounts of money. The money you do carry should be divided into smaller amounts and kept in separate places. Enough should be carried if the need arises to pay for various "services".

● Do not arrange your days in routines, as this will make it easier for potential aggressors to elaborate plans against you.

● When at the UNDAC base, living quarters, hotels, etc., investigate possible escape routes in case the building is attacked or a fire breaks out. Observe the number of windows in each room and where they are situated, the best ways out of rooms, the best places to seek cover, etc. Know the fire escape plan - or create one for yourself. Make these things a habit.

● If you leave the team base, make sure that someone, preferably the Team Leader or someone appointed by him to manage security, knows where you are, how long the trip will take, and the estimated time that you will return.

● If you regularly travel between two fixed places, e.g., between living quarters and the base; try not to travel at the same time each day and try to change the routes of travel.

● When outside the UNDAC base, always stay together with another team member, if possible.

● When going into the field, ask people who have just been to the same place and travelled the same route about the security and safety situation.

● If you are equipped with a helmet and/or a flak jacket or bullet-proof vest, make sure you use them; they do work and may save your life.

● When parking, be sure to park in a way that it will be fast and easy to drive away if necessary, e.g., do not park with the front of the vehicle against a wall or any other obstruction.

● Make it a rule that you never pick up people wanting a lift; you do not know who the person is and what his/her intentions may be. Especially, do not pick up military personnel or police, as they may be dangerous or they may be targeted, which will then endanger you. Also, if you are stranded, e.g., because of breakdown, etc., do not accept rides from the police or military for the same reasons.

● If you should be the target of a robbery, the following procedures should be followed: try to keep calm; do not be provocative; do not play the hero; be passive and talk only when spoken to; obey orders; be cooperative; avoid eye contact; and, in most situations, make it understood that you are a UN representative. BUT: Stand out from

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others only if appropriate.

- When driving, steer around potholes. They may not be ordinary potholes, but craters with unexploded artillery or mortar shells or holes with mines. Be especially aware of small holes, as these may be the entry hole of shells. Just because other vehicles have gone through a pothole does not mean that there is not unexploded ordnance; it may survive 35 vehicles, while the 36th will trigger it.

- If you have a camera, be cautious where you use it. Photos should never be taken where there are soldiers, military activity or checkpoints.

- To be prepared for evacuation, you should always have a bag packed with private items, warm clothes, extra food and drink, a first-aid kit, helmet, and flak jacket, if supplied.

- Always carry UN credentials and passport. A photocopy of the passport may be useful to hand out instead of the passport, if officials demand to have the passport. Even a duplicate passport may be useful.

It should be mentioned that local populations may have cultural practices governing acceptable personal relationship that are different from the individual UNDAC member's culture. For these and other reasons, it is not advisable to enter into close, personal relations of a type that could affect security. Intimate relationships with the opposite sex should, generally, be avoided, not only for the above reasons but also because of possible serious health consequences.

N.5. Evacuation plan

The Team Leader is usually responsible for establishing evacuation plans, which must coincide with the plans of the DO. Evacuation plans may be divided into:

1. Semi-evacuation - in case it is necessary to reduce personnel down to a skeleton team.

2. Full evacuation - when there is enough time for the whole team to evacuate in an orderly manner and take all the equipment, vehicles, etc., with them.

3. Emergency evacuation - when there is time for the team to take only the most necessary equipment and vehicles.

4. Relocation (in-country) – or "Survival in Situ" plans for situations when it is either to late or to dangerous to move. (Sometimes referred to as a "Hibernation plan" or "Bunker Down plan".)

Items that should be included in these plans are: always keep a sufficient amount of money for evacuation purposes; always keep a fuel reserve ready for vehicles to be used; pin-point vehicles to be used for emergency evacuation; find potential routes to be used out of the area; if possible, make agreements beforehand with authorities, border posts, NGOs, etc.

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Annex

Baseline MOSS tables

The following tables are cumulative, with those requirements starting at No Phase being implicit to all other Phases, i.e., the requirements of MOSS under Phase III include all the requirements of No Phase, Phases I and II.

No Phase

Telecommunications

The concept of an Emergency Communications System (ECS) ensures there is a reliable communications structure/link established between that UN staff that has been appointed with security and safety responsibilities, i.e., DO, CSA/FSCO, SMT members, Wardens, ASCs and selected staff. The ECS is a structural and procedural element of MOSS that is reinforced by radios at Phase I.

The ECS is based on "appropriate and available means" to ensure reliable security/safety communications between the SMT members, Warden and ASCs. This may be a combination of cellular telephones, landline telephones, email or radios, as appropriate. Mobile satellite telephones are required to enable the CSA/FSCO and DO to maintain communications with UN DSS and other organizations.

Security-plan and staff

A Security Plan, based on a formal Security Risk Assessment, is required for all UN duty stations as described in the FSH to include an operational Warden system and the appointment of ASCs, as appropriate. Each UN Country Team must establish local security Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for various emergency scenarios. All buildings are to have an Emergency Evacuation Plan in place. Staff should be fully briefed on the contents of these documents and have access to all relevant UN policy and operational security documents.

All UN staff is required to complete the basic Security Awareness' CD-ROM.

Security managers must be aware of the need to provide training and briefings for the general staff and for those with security responsibilities. The CSA/FSCO is required to undertake such training and UN DSS can provide additional resources.

Contingency plans for Phase I are to be developed.

Equipment

All UN vehicles may be utilised throughout all areas of the country under any security phase. All UN drivers must have appropriate driving documentation (national driving licenses and/or relevant UN certification).

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No Phase

All UN vehicles may be utilised throughout all areas of the country under any UN vehicles must be able to be identified as UN vehicles at all times and must be correctly registered and insured in the country.

"Emergency power supply" is a common-system, independent and reliable source of electrical generation to ensure communications equipment is operative, security lighting is available at all times, and essential business functions may be conducted even after the loss of "city supplied" or commercially supplied power. Emergency fuel is required for these facilities in all instances. A contingency plan for the procurement of Phase I equipment is to be established.

The CSA/FSCO is provided with certain standard equipment by UN DSS.

Phase I

Telecommunications

Radios are required in the establishment of a Phase I, or higher, ECS because they provide an independent means of communication that is not afforded by cellular telephones and hand-held, satellite telephones.

In Phase I the ECS is reinforced with a fully operational and independent radio network of UHF, VHF and/or HF radios. The ECS in Phase I is to be monitored on a 24/hour basis – this ensures that emergency calls are effectively serviced. A simple system of identifying a duty officer may be appropriate for monitoring purposes. In this way security linkage is maintained between all security officials at the duty station. Lastly, there is a requirement to equip and establish a common-system Communications Centre/Radio Room, and a Crises Coordination Centre in the capital, and at each of those outlying locations outside the Capital. There is no requirement to have these facilities operating on a 24/hour a day basis but they are to be operated effectively.

Security Plan and staff

Security clearance procedures (in accordance with the FSH) are to be established and implemented. This includes country-specific travel clearance procedures. SMTs are required to meet at least monthly.

Contingency plan for resource mobilisation of equipment requirements in readiness for Phase II and above to be developed. A briefing on UN security arrangements and Security Plan is provided to all staff

All staff to prepare individual emergency bags. A bag of maximum 15 kg designed to be ready for rapid relocation or evacuation. Contains identification and essential items only.

Phase I

Equipment

Under Phase I the DO is responsible to be aware of the location of all UN staff at all times and an effective and reliable system to monitor their whereabouts is required.

Further, all vehicles are to have an "effective and reliable" means of communications – this may be achieved by a proven reliable, cellular telephone system with wide-area coverage. This allows the implementation of the necessary system of movement control (or tracking) of UN vehicles so that the DO can fulfil his/her responsibilities.

In addition, field vehicles need to be identified and equipped. These are full-size, 4x4 vehicles equipped with radio communications for field missions outside of the capital area/region.

Phase II

Telecommunications

As per the FSH, "essential staff" is to be identified, and provided with VHF/UHF radios.

Satellite phones provided to DO, agency heads, CSA/FSCO, and other key-individuals.

The dedicated Radio Rooms are to be operated to maintain 24/7 communications operations. This will likely include email, fax and satellite telephone operations.

Security Plan

Phase II is typically considered as an interim Security Phase during which the SMT considers whether the security environment is likely to deteriorate further (perhaps to Phase III) or to improve (return to Phase I).

Equipment

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All vehicles operating in a Phase II environment are to be equipped with UHF, VHF and/or HF radios.

A common-system radio technician employed.

A trauma kit is required in Phase II. It is an advanced first aid kit with specialised medical equipment to treat major trauma injuries. Normally, this requires the attendance of a qualified paramedic, nurse or doctor. At least one UN staff member should be trained in the use of this equipment.

Contingency plans are required for the procurement and installation of Phase II MOSS communications equipment and appropriate specialised equipment.

Phase III

Telecommunications

Operate Crisis Coordination Centre as required.

All vehicles to be equipped with VHF and/or HF radios.

Satellite phones provided for field vehicles as appropriate.

All international staff and selected national staff (mandatory for drivers) to be provided with VHF and/or HF radios.

Security Plan and staff

Specialised training must be provided to selected staff on:
- Trauma kits.
- Protective equipment/facilities.
- Body armour usage.
- Mine awareness.
- GPS-systems.

Ongoing country–specific, country-wide, staff security training scheduled.

SMT to meet every week and ASC to form local SMT and meet weekly.

Equipment

Specialised equipment to be identified and procured for field vehicles as appropriate, e.g., extra spare tires, spare fuel, emergency lights, ballistic blankets, etc.

Specialised protective equipment is to be procured and fitted.
Bunkers, body armour, ballistic blankets and blast resistant film are required only if the country/area Security Risk Assessment performed substantiates a threat from a bomb and/or war environment and when endorsed by a competent authority. UN DSS maintains the minimum standards required for bunkers, ballistic blankets and blast protective film for glass.

Field vehicles to be utilized for all missions.

GPS located with ASC and at each country office.

Emergency power supply to all UN offices with emergency fuel and spare parts.

Emergency food stocks for concentration points obtained and managed as per FSH.

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Phase IV
Telecommunications
No change from Phase III
Security Plan and staff
No change from Phase III
Equipment
No change from Phase III

Phase V
Telecommunications
Special security clearance procedures and resource requirements as directed by UN DSS
Security Plan and staff
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Equipment
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Mine awareness

There are a number of countries, including disaster-prone ones, which have mines left over from various conflicts. It is vital that UNDAC team members going to these countries have minimum knowledge on how to avoid mines and what to do if the worst happens. In this handbook it is not possible to go into detail concerning precautions to take against mines. It is, therefore, advisable to get further information from, for example, one of the NGOs that have been established in recent years to deal with this kind of threat. The following recommendations address what to do and what not to do.

Avoiding mines

First of all it is advisable to seek local information from the authorities, the UN and NGOs on where the mines might be. There may even be maps where dangerous areas have been marked. Even though information on the whereabouts of mines has been received, it should be used only as a guideline, as there could be mines elsewhere. Be aware that a map with an overview of the minefield may lead to a false sense of security.

Never go into visible minefields; these may be visible by mines scattered on the surface or by the minefield being fenced or marked with signs warning of

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danger. Be aware that minefields that have been cleared may have been re-mined. It happens that mines are cleared during the daytime only to be re-mined the following night.

If an area has been fought over, it is likely that parts of it have been mined. Terrain around military positions (or former positions) and terrain that is seen to afford a defence for enemy troops near military positions is most likely mined. Buildings in areas where there has been fighting may also be mined or booby-trapped. Booby traps may be in connection with doors, under carpets, under bodies, in connection with food as well as medical and first-aid equipment, in connection with objects that could be seen as mementos, etc. Do not go through gaps in hedges, as there may well be trip-wired mines.

If there is any doubt at any time as to whether an area or a building has been mined, turn back.

When travelling in places that are high-risk mine areas (and this should be done only if absolutely necessary), then when travelling by car use only roads and tracks that are well-used and when walking use only paths that are well-used. Avoid areas of fresh earth, whether on roads, tracks or paths. It is important to know also that even well-travelled areas may have been re-mined during the night. When in need to urinate or defecate, never go outside the road, track or path; either do it in the open or wait. Areas full of fresh human excrement will usually be safe from mines.

Never approach mines, ammunition or suspicious objects, as this may be both dangerous and a bad example to the local community. Do not, under any circumstances, handle or touch unexploded ordnance (or anything else that looks suspicious), however harmless it may appear. If mines or unexploded ordnance are observed, make a note of the position and, if possible, the type (mine, shell, bomb, etc.) and report back.

Remember to be alert. Most mine injuries occur because people do not see the mines. This is understandable because the mines are usually buried, camouflaged or covered over by vegetation; or else the victim is simply looking in the wrong direction. Being alert and observant of certain signs will not make travelling in mined areas safe, but it will make it safer. There are certain clues that may be looked for in order to avoid mines. These are:

- Shapes that are unusual in nature (sharp edges, round or rectangular objects, etc.) and colours that are unusual in nature (rusty-coloured surfaces, metallic colours and plastic surfaces). Mines are usually round (cylindrical) or rectangular and may be made from metal, plastic or wood.
- Thin, taut, partly buried or entangled wire as well as fishing line, etc. These may be connected to mines and must never be touched.
- Stakes, poles, etc., especially if they are connected with wire. These may be connected to mines.

- Signs of mines having been brought to detonation, e.g. animal remains, pieces of footwear, etc.
  Signs of battles having occurred in the area, such as bunkers, barbed wire, weapons, helmets, destroyed vehicles, ammunition, etc.
- Buildings that may have been occupied or used during fighting.
- After heavy rains, that have created floods or landslides, mines may well have floated away or washed away; beware of areas near floods and landslides.

If the worst happens
The two most usual ways in which you will discover that you are in a minefield are:

    1. If there is an explosion.
    2. If you find a mine.

If an explosion occurs or a mine is found, the first thing to do is to stop all movement. Any movement may detonate one or more nearby mines. Anyone in the vicinity must be warned. If there is a casualty, it is most important that he/she does not move and that - at least initially - no-one goes into the minefield to help. People rushing in to help are very often either killed or maimed. First aid may be given only when a safe path has been found into the field.

Establishing a safe path into or out of a mine field is something that should be done only as a last resort. It is always best to get professional help, either from trained military personnel (usually from an engineering regiment) or from a de-mining NGO. If a safe path has to be found without professional help, the following must be done:

1. If there is a safe path
- If possible, find out where the closest safe area is. This should be the direction in which the path must go. The safest path, though, would usually be the route that was used on the way into the minefield.
- If there is more than one person in the minefield, only one person should be in charge, and only one person must move at a time. Keep a safe distance of at least 10-20 metres between each person.
- The original route into the minefield should be followed very closely, while the person moving must stay alert at all times. Panic must, as far as possible, be stopped immediately.

2. If there is no safe path
- If you cannot remember your route into the minefield or if you find a mine on the route that you thought was safe, then the only way forward is by probing for mines. Probing is done with an instrument, e.g. a knife at least 8-10 cm long (remember to procure such an instrument before entering an area where there is a risk of mines). This is used to stick into the ground at an angle of 30 degrees. Every

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square cm of the path must be probed. If there is an obstruction, this is carefully exposed. If it is a mine, then warn the others, mark the spot (use stones, pieces of wood, etc.) and continue probing.

● When probing, it is important to decide the width of the path to probe: if it is too narrow, someone may tread outside; if it is too wide, an unnecessary amount of time may be used to probe and there will be further risk of detonating a mine. Be aware that probing is time-consuming, very tiring and nerve-racking, especially for the untrained.

3. Rescuing a mine victim

● If a path must be made to rescue a mine victim, this should be done only if the person is alive and when there is no professional help. When the person has been reached (by one of the above methods), an area around the person must be cleared, allowing room for the use of first aid. Be careful, as there may be untriggered mines under the casualty: probe under the person.

● If the casualty is hysterical, it is vital to calm him/her before getting close. Often, though, victims are unusually calm; this is because they have had a traumatic shock.

● When the above has been carried out, give first aid.

● When ready, the casualty must be extricated from the minefield. This can be done, for example, by using a fireman's lift or by pulling the person along the path. It is important to be very careful so as not to get injured by mines yourself.

It is important to be aware that rescuing a casualty from a minefield is a very risky undertaking and that no one is, therefore, obliged to carry this out. The use of helicopter evacuation by winch is a possibility that should be looked into.

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